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NOTES & COMMENTS
FACTORS OR PRICES? AN EVALUATION OF
ANTIDUMPING LAWS AS APPLIED TO COMPANIES
EXISTING IN NONMARKET ECONOMIES
Lydia Brashear*
INTRODUCTION
One area of United States trade policy focuses on the effect of for-
eign imports on American industries.' To counter the effect of foreign
import injury, domestic industries request that the United States De-
partment of Commerce (DOC) enforce laws to determine whether for-
eign companies are illegally "dumping" their products into the United
States economy.' To determine foreign companies' compliance with fair
competition laws, Congress and the DOC have developed procedures
for penalizing foreign companies that harm or threaten to harm Ameri-
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Washington College of Law, The American University.
This article is dedicated in memory of my mother, Lydia Rothman Brashear.
1. See Jackson, Introduction: Perspective on Antidumping Law and Policy, re-
printed in ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1979) (stating that
although trade policy concerns foreign relations, in the United States trade has often
been viewed as an internal policy issue). The United States treats trade as a domestic
issue because private citizens and businesses demand to participate in decisions ulti-
mately affecting them. Id. at 2.
2. Id. Dumping refers to a foreign company's practice of selling its goods in the
United States at prices lower than those in the foreign company's home market. Id.
The laws penalize foreign companies only to the extent that the dumped products hurt
domestic companies. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COM ,-
MERCE, SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES FOR ANTIDUMPING FAIR VALUE INVESTIGATIONS
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 AS AMENDED 5 (1987) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES]. The ITA estimates dumping duties at the level that the
value of merchandise exceeds the United States price. Id. The Code defines dumping
margins as the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price of the merchandise. 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(f) (1989). The weighted average dumping
margin is the result of dividing the aggregate dumping margins by the aggregate
United States prices. Id.
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can industries.3 Under congressionally enacted rules and procedures,
the DOC determines when and to what extent a foreign company is
dumping its products.4 Antidumping laws, which serve several main
purposes, 5 most importantly deter foreign companies from attempting
to sell their products at less than fair value (LTFV)6 in the United
States.
7
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19888 (1988 Trade
Act) substantially changed the procedures for determining when im-
ports from nonmarket economies 9 (NMEs) threaten the ability of
American producers to sell their products and earn profits.10 This case
comment will focus on the changes in United States trade law and the
effect of these changes on determining when NME companies violate
that law. Presently, changes in world order, economic alignment, and
the recent political and economic shifts in the Union of Soviet Socialist
3. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING/COUNTERVAILING DUTY LEGISLATION 1 (1987) [here-
inafter ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION] (describing the DOC's application of antidumping
laws and countervailing duties to determine when the United States should redress in-
juries to domestic industries caused by foreign company imports).
4. Id. at I; see also Coursey & Binder, Hypothetical Calculations Under the
United States Antidumping Duty Law: Foreign Market Value, United States Price,
and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 537, 537-53
(1989) (describing how dumping calculations are made in a hypothetical case).
5. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 1; see U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
THE TOKYO ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS: ANTIDUMPING DUTIES 1, 1 (1982) [herein-
after TOKYO ROUND] (claiming that antidumping duties "neutralize the effect" of
dumping, protect American companies, and "promote fair international trade").
6. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 1. The statute itself provides no
definition of less than fair value (LTFV) sales. Id. A LTFV sale occurs when the "free
on board" (FOB) plant price to purchasers in the exporter's home market exceeds the
FOB plant price to United States purchasers. Id. The FOB is a price option contract
term between the seller and the buyer of international goods. R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON
& J. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 34 (1986) [hereinafter R.
FOLSOM]. When the buyer purchases goods FOB, the contract price of the goods in-
cludes the list price of the goods plus the cost of crating the goods for shipment. Id.
7. ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 1. In comparison to dumping laws,
countervailing duty laws penalize infringing countries with an unfair trade advantage
caused by their own government provided subsidies. Id.
8. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
1316(b)(18), 102 Stat. 1107, 4143 (1988) (amending 19 U.S.C. 1677 Supp. 1988).
9. Id. The term NME refers to an economy in which the forces of supply and
demand fail to operate freely. FOLSOM, supra note 6, at 1037. NMEs usually exist in
communist countries where the government's intervention in the economy monopolizes
all forms of trade. Allan & Hiscock, East-West Trade: The Philosophies and Practi-
calities of State Trading, 8 MONASH U.L. REV. 135, 135 (1982). In trading with
NME companies, the western importer will often deal with state trade organizations or
other governmental agencies. R. FOLSOM, supra note 6, at 12. Economists often charac-
terize NME nations as having a shortage of hard currency. Id.
10. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text (describing the changes facili-
tated by the 1988 Trade Act's NME provisions).
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Republics (USSR) and the East European bloc countries have in-
creased the significance of this trade issue." Additionally, as the inter-
dependence among nations increases, the United States' concern over
the actions of its trade partners correspondingly increases. 2
This Comment will analyze the complexity of applying the new 1988
Trade Act to cases concerning NME countries. 3 Part I provides a
background, describing, first, how the International Trade Commission
(ITC) and the International Trade Administration (ITA)"4 proceed
with dumping determinations and, second, how the NME element in-
fluences these dumping calculations. Part II discusses the ITA's recent
determination in Urea from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,'
while Part III analyzes the ITA's decision and illuminates the difficulty
of applying complicated rules to this area of trade law. Part III then
discusses alternatives to the present NME dumping calculation by ex-
11. Watson, Super Partners, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1989, at 31. The discussions
between Gorbachev and Bush during the Malta summit, held aboard the Maxim
Gorky, indicate that the United States and the USSR want to facilitate increased free
trade. Id. The United States hopes to aid the USSR in achieving needed economic
reform, or perestroika, by approving more liberal free trade agreements between the
two countries. Id. During the summit, Bush's proposals for aiding the USSR included
negotiating a new trade agreement that would give the USSR most favored nation
status, concluding a treaty to protect and encourage American investment in the
USSR, and eventually offering the USSR observer status in the General Agreements
on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Id.; see Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone, Kissinger, East-
West Relations, 68 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 14 (1989) (stating that Gorbachev intended
the Soviet Union to become a "normal" participant in international economic rela-
tions); Hey, How Much is That in Rubles?, 37 NAT'L J. 2,245, 2,245 (1989) (revealing
one example of the USSR's recent attempts at capitalism through a Soviet competition
to develop the best idea for converting the ruble to hard currency).
12. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 2-3 (1979) (discussing the revolutionary develop-
ments affecting modern trade policy). These revolutionary developments include: (1) an
increased degree of international interdependence; (2) sharp fluctuations in the relative
prices of goods; (3) the aftermath and breakdown of post World War 11 rules of mod-
ern trade conduct; and (4) the revelation that the GATT's inflexibility and outdated-
ness cannot remedy problems in the modern trade world. Id.; Stanfield, Beyond the
Cold War, 37 NAT'L J. 2,254, 2,254 (1989) (describing the recent changes in the So-
viet Union and eastern bloc countries). East-West specialists acknowledge that develop-
ing a new economic relationship is a "plunge into the uncharted." Id. at 2,257. Yet
United States economic involvement is crucial not only for the Soviets but to maintain
American relations with Western Europe. Id. Many commentators agree that the
United States can only help the USSR by removing obstacles impeding free trade be-
tween the two countries. Id. at 2,258. The effect of the United States' interference in
the trade policies of other eastern bloc countries may vary because these countries have
their own individual economic systems and problems. Id.
13. See S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1987) [hereinafter S. REP.]
(explaining how the DOC experiences difficulties when applying antidumping laws to
NME cases).
14. See infra note 23 (describing the ITA's function).
15. Urea From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
1990]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
plaining proposals brought before Congress enacted the 1988 Trade
Act. Finally, Part IV of this Comment suggests possible changes to
simplify the present law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. DUMPING DETERMINATIONS
Administrative procedures governing dumping determinations" are
highly technical calculations which the ITA and the ITC must under-
take in a timely manner.17 Dumping investigations and proceedings be-
gin when an interested party'" files a petition with the ITA.'9 This peti-
tion must contain information about the petitioner and the allegedly
dumped goods.20 The petition should also contain the grounds for sus-
pecting the dumping and describe the potential material injury to the
United States industry or industries."' The investigative portion of a
dumping proceeding progresses in the same manner against a foreign
company whether its country has a market or nonmarket economy. 2
16. See 19 C.F.R. § 353 (1989) (regulating the application of Antidumping
duties).
17. See infra note 24 (illustrating the time frame for dumping investigations).
18. 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(k) (1989). The Code defines an interested party as: (1) a
foreign manufacturer, producer or exporter or United States importer of the same
goods; (2) a foreign government in which the goods are produced; (3) a United States
manufacturer producing the same goods; (4) a certified or recognized United States
union representing the industry in question; (5) a United States trade or business asso-
ciation producing a like product; or (6) an association wherein a majority are interested
parties according to this section. Id.
19. See Id. § 353.12 (discussing petition requirements).
20. Id. The act requires petitioners to include the following relevant information:
(1) the address of the petitioner; (2) the names of foreign firms producing and export-
ing goods; (3) a description of the goods in question; (4) the volume and value of these
goods; and (5) a list of companies exporting or importing the goods. Id. If the petition
deals with goods exported from a NME country, petitioner must supply any available
information on the alleged goods' sales price within the NME country's own economy.
Id. § 353.12(8). A complete petition also includes evidence of costs and prices of im-
ported goods helpful to the ITA in calculating the FMV and the United States price.
Id. § 353.12(7); see ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 3 (describing what
facts a petitioner must allege before filing the complaint with the ITA).
21. 19 C.F.R. § 353.12 (1989).; see ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 3
(describing the factors that evidence material injury). These are: value and volume of
imports over three years prior to case initiation, the effect imports have on undercutting
or depressing prices of similar American products, decline in productivity in United
States industry, and detrimental effects on inventories, employment, salaries, cash and
investment. Id.; see also TOKYO ROUND, supra note 5, at 4 (claiming that for injury
determinations, the DOC looks at the imports' effect on sales, market share, profits,
productivity, investment return, capacity, prices, cash flow, inventories, labor, wages,
growth rate, and ability to invest or raise capital).
22. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.11-353.26 (1989).
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1. Investigations and Proceedings
The ITA and the ITC conduct simultaneous dumping investiga-
tions.23 After receiving a petition from a domestic company or inter-
ested party, the ITA conducts a summary investigation. 24 Upon com-
pletion of this initial inquiry, and within twenty days after receiving the
petition, the ITA either dismisses the case or initiates a full dumping
investigation.2" Once the ITA decides to proceed with the investigation,
it mails questionnaires to exporters requesting information on prices
and costs of the dumped products.26 After receiving the results from
these questionnaires, the ITA attempts to verify the data received."
Problems arise, however, when respondents fail to complete or return
the questionnaires.2 If the ITA does not receive responses to its ques-
23. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 1. The ITA and the ITC operate
as independent agencies of the DOC. Id. The ITA determines if a foreign company
exported its goods at LTFV, while the ITC focuses on the extent a foreign company
injured a United States industry. Id.
24. Id. The ITA dismisses the petition if it fails to contain sufficient information on
which to base antidumping charges. 19 C.F.R. § 353.13 (1989). The following table
provides a visual timeline of a DOC dumping investigation:
Flowchart for a Normal Antidumping Duty Investigation Day Action
0 Petition filed
20 Decision on Initiation
45 Preliminary Injury Determination by ITC
160 Preliminary Determination by ITA
235 Final Determination by ITA
280 Final Injury Determination by ITC
287 Publication of Order Administrative Review
SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 7.
25. ANTIDUMPING LEGISLATION, supra note 3, at 3.
26. SUMMARY Or PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 2. The Secretary of Commerce will
require questionnaire respondents to submit information for the 140 days prior to and
thirty days after the month that the ITA first received the petition. Id.; see Horlick &
DeBusk, Commerce Procedures Under Existing and Proposed Antidumping/Counter-
vailing Duty Regulations, 22 INT'L LAW. 99, 109 (1988) (revealing that a respondents
response to questionnaires can decisively affect the success or failure of respondent's
case).
27. 19 C.F.R. § 353.36 (1989). See generally Macrory, Fair Value Investigations
and Administrative Reviews Under the Anti-Dumping Statute, reprinted in 372 U.S.
ItPoRT RELIEF LAWS 9, 11 (1985) (stating that DOC officials will actually visit for-
eign manufacturers to check the reliability of questionnaire answers). It is helpful to
think of verifications as thorough financial audits because the ITA traces individual
responses to the company's source documents and financial statements. Id. at 13.
28. See Verrill, Nomnarket Economy Dumping: New Directions in Fair Value
Analysis, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 427, 428-29 (1988) (supporting the
proposition that problems arose when the DOC implemented verification procedures).
Foreign manufacturers and exporters either lack access to relevant data on prices and
costs or the expense to the foreign company providing this data outweighs the benefit of
the foreign company's participation in the investigation. Id.; see Tung-Pi Chen, Are
Anti-Dumping Laws of Canada and Other Western Countries Keeping Pace with
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tions within the 160 days that the Code mandates for issuing a prelimi-
nary determination,29 the ITA lacks essential data that it needs to pro-
ceed with the dumping calculations.3" When the ITA does not receive
company data or is unable to verify data received, it applies the doc-
trine of "best information otherwise available"(BIA).' This rule en-
ables the ITA to estimate prices and costs by substituting alternative
sources of data for the missing information.
32
Before the ITA concludes its initial investigation, the ITC prelimina-
rily decides if a foreign company's trading activities injured or
threatened to injure American industries.33 If the ITC finds no injury,
it immediately terminates the investigation. 4 If the ITC finds an actual
or threatened injury, the ITA makes and publishes a preliminary deter-
mination.35 The ITA then makes a final determination within seventy-
five days of its preliminary determination.3"
In addition, if the petition alleges "critical circumstances," the ITA
investigates to determine if they exist.3 7 Critical circumstances exist if
the country has a history of dumping, and "massive" imports of the
product occurred over a relatively short period of time.38 A positive
determination of critical circumstances subjects a foreign company to
China's Economic Structural Reform? 19 GEO. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 717, 736 (1987)
(describing verification problems).
29. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1989).
30. Id. § 353.37 (1989).
31. Id. The provision requires the Secretary to use the best information available
(BIA) whenever respondents fail to complete an accurate and timely factual response
to questionnaires, or when the Secretary cannot verify accuracy and completeness of
the factual information submitted within the investigation's time restraints. Id.
32. Id. Other sources may include information that the petitioner provides or public
statistics on certain facets of an industry. Id. If the petitioner prevents the ITA from
receiving such data, the ITA will consider this in its determination. Id.
33. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 2.
34. 19 C.F.R. § 353.17(c) (1989).
35. Id. § 353.15(a). Under this regulation, the ITA issues a preliminary determina-
tion 160 days after receiving the petition. Id. In its preliminary determination, the ITA
decides whether there is a reasonable basis to suspect that importers are selling or are
likely to sell imported goods at LTFV. Id. § 353.39(a)(1). The ITA will also hold a
hearing if any party to the investigation so requests. Id. § 353.38.
36. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES, supra note 2, at 4. In some instances, when export-
ers or petitioners so request, the ITA will postpone the determination to not later than
135 days after the date of a preliminary determination. Id.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GLOSSARY OF ANTIDUMPING TERMS AND PHRASES
(1987) [hereinafter GLOSSARY].
38. Id. Under the regulations, critical circumstances exist if: (1) there is a history
of dumping in the United States or elsewhere of the class or kind of merchandise which
is the subject of the investigation; or (2) the importer knew or should have known that
the producer or seller was selling the merchandise at LTFV, and there have been mas-
sive imports of the merchandise over a relatively short period. 19 C.F.R. § 353.16
(1989).
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an extended period of antidumping duties.39
2. Calculations for LTFV Sales
Throughout the investigation and proceedings, the ITA attempts to
find information to prove that a foreign company has sold its products
at LTFV.40 To facilitate the determination of LTFV sales, the ITA will
compare the United States price4 to the foreign market value (FMV)
of the product.42 If the FMV is higher than the United States price,
and a material injury occurred, the ITA will order anti-dumping sanc-
tions against the company.
42
B. NME DUMPING
1. Difficulties Arising from NME Dumping
Comparing the FMV to the United States price, generally a straight-
39. 19 C.F.R. § 353.16 (1989). An antidumping duty is a sanction placed against
companies that violate American antidumping laws and is determined individually for
each imported product. GLOSSARY, supra note 37. The amount of the antidumping duty
is valued at the difference between the United States price and the FMV at the time of
sale. Id. If the Commerce Department makes a positive finding of critical circum-
stances, it will suspend goods for 90 additional days and will apply the duties for this
additional time period. 19 C.F.R. § 353.16 (1989).
40. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing sales at LTFV).
41. 19 C.F.R. § 353.41 (1989). The ITA defines the United States price as either
the purchase price or the exporter's sales price. GLOSSARY, supra note 37. The distinc-
tion between these two price values turns on whether the exporter is related to the
United States importer. Macrory, supra note 27, at 22. The ITA uses the purchase
price in cases where the foreign exporter is unrelated to the United States importer and
the exporter's sales price when the two parties are related. Id.
A Federal Court of Appeals decision explains why the ITA uses these two possible
values for the United States price. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d
1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The court stated that one of the statute's goals is to make
"the fair value comparison on a fair basis - comparing apples with apples." Id. There-
fore the ITA must make comparisons using the purchase price value separate from
comparisons using the exporter's sales price value. Id. If the ITA used both the ex-
porter's sales price offset and the purchase price in the same United States price com-
parison, the exporter's sales price would favor a higher dumping margin. Id.; accord
Homer & Bello, Import Law and Policy Series: Fair "Apples to Apples" Comparisons
in Dumping Cases, 19 IN'L LAW. 927, 929 (1985) (deciphering the Court of Appeals'
decision).
42. GLOSSARY, supra note 37. The FMV is the price at which manufacturers sell or
offer to sell merchandise in the principal markets of the exporting country. Id. For
example, if the ITA finds viable foreign home market sales, the agency bases FMV on
prices to third countries or constructed values. Id. The ITA makes adjustments for
quantities sold, circumstances of sale, and differences in the merchandise to ensure a
proper comparison with prices in the United States. Id.
43. 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1989). After receiving a positive final determination, the
ITA publishes an antidumping duty order. Id. The DOC then requires the foreign com-
pany to pay extra duties on goods previously under investigation. Id.
1990]
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forward procedure, becomes problematic when the ITA attempts to ap-
ply the antidumping laws to companies operating in NME countries.44
To determine when a foreign company in a market economy dumps its
products, the ITA calculates the FMV by using the producers' costs
and prices.45 In investigating a NME dumping case, however, the ITA
must account for the fact that NME governments set producers' costs
and subsidize factors of production.4" Because of this government inter-
vention, the prices of goods that the United States imports from NME
countries fail to reflect the market forces of supply and demand.
47
Thus, the comparison between the United States price which reflects
market forces, and the FMV which reflects non-market forces, is of
little value."
Despite the awareness of the difficulties inherent in NME dumping,
legislators have only recently confronted these problems.49 One reason
for changes in this area of the law is the difficulty of applying pre-
existing laws to NME cases.5" For example, the ability of NME com-
panies to provide adequate price data has decreased dramatically.!1
Another reason is the concern for protecting American industries and
44. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
1316(b)(18), 102 Stat. 1107, 4143 (1988).
45. Stokes, Trade Moves China Off the Sidelines, 18 NAT'L J. 1,080, 1,080 (1987).
Yet, when a NME economy is involved, the ITA finds it extremely difficult to obtain
the needed information from NME companies to calculate FMV. Id.
46. Id.; see F. HOLZMAN, THE SOVIET ECONOMY PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6
(1982) (comparing the Soviet Union which operates under a central planning system to
western capitalist countries where the interaction of market forces determines a good's
quantity, production time and customers). In the Soviet Union, central planners, known
as the Gosplan, draw up guidelines for production that manufacturers must adhere to
over a period of time. Id.
47. Verrill, supra note 28, at 428. The absence of traditional forces of supply and
demand place prices and cost structures of the NME beyond the scope of a normal
antidumping calculation. Id.
48. See Kaplan & Varga, Recent Developments in the Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Area, reprinted in 372 U.S. IMPORT RELIEF LAWS 77, 84 (1985) (stating
that no basis exists for home market prices because the governments of NME countries
determine the relative costs and prices of goods and do not base prices on the interplay
of local or worldwide supply and demand).
49. See Cuneo & Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The State Controlled Economy
Issue in Antidumping Laws Administration, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277 (1982)
(describing antidumping legislation and stating that the 1974 Trade Act contained the
first statutory provision to deal with NME countries).
50. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (implying that the antidumping laws
prior to the 1988 Trade Act do not work well).
51. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (revealing that verification poses
a real problem for the ITA when it is trying to complete an investigation); infra notes
119-122 and accompanying text (illustrating in Urea the inadequacies of employing the
price method).
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laborers from NME dumping.2
2. Legislation
a. Historical perspective
The Antidumping Act of 1921 (1921 Act) first provided duties
against companies that dumped their products in the United States
economy. 3 The 1921 Act provided only two methods for determining
52. See Memorandum to the File, Ex-Parte Meeting Antidumping Case on Urea
from the Soviet Union (Sept. 3, 1986) (statement of Albert Melnikov, Acting Trade
Representative of the USSR) (emphasizing that Soviet trade organizations are working
with American companies to complete trade contracts based on economic cooperation).
After 1986, this concern escalated because the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States overturned one method for dealing with the
NME problem. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The court held that a NME does not contain countervailable subsidies. Id.
Countervailing duty law tests whether a foreign company has an "unfair competitive
advantage" stemming from the receipt of government subsidies. ANTIDUhIPING LEGIS-
LATION, supra note 3, at 1; see also Comment, Implementation and Policy Problems in
the Application of Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1,647, 1,647 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Implementation and Pol-
icy] (declaring that the Georgetown decision does not exempt countervailing duty laws
from NME cases). Georgetown, however, makes the countervailing duty laws inappli-
cable to NME cases because of the difficulty of identifying and quantifying subsidies in
NMEs. Id.; Note, The Effect of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States on
Nonmarket Economy Imports, 3 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 83 (1988) (claiming
that the Georgetown decision left only interested parties with the remedies of an-
tidumping laws and section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982), to
redress NME import injuries). Section 406 allows the President to act immediately if a
communist country's imports threaten an American industry. Id. at 87. The President
invokes section 406 pending an investigation. Id.; Hunter & Kuhbach, Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties: Highlights Since 1984, reprinted in 570 TuE CO.%IIERCE DE-
PARTMENT SPEAKS 1987 491, 495-506 (1987) (explaining the effect of Georgetown on
the future of NME trade cases).
In hindsight, the changes in the NME law were practical as the possibility of in-
creased trade with the USSR seems imminent. B. BUBNOV, FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE
USSR, A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RECENT REFORMS 72 (1987). Reforms within the
USSR have affected the country's "external economic relations." Id. at 73. These re-
forms would include implementation of an integrated policy to deal with foreign mar-
kets and the increase in trade and production. Id. But cf. F. HOLZMAN, supra note 46,
at 57 (stating that trade between the two countries may decrease despite economic
changes). The United States lacks strong economic ties with the Soviet Union and,
therefore, cannot strongly influence the USSR by reducing trade. Id. Furthermore, the
unwillingness of Western Europe to apply sanctions against the USSR in accordance
with the United States' efforts greatly reduces American influence in Soviet economic
policy. Id.
53. Act of May 27, 1921, § 201, 42 Stat. 11, repealed and superceded by Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144; see Comment, Implementa-
tion and Policy, supra note 52, at 1653-54 (stating that the 1921 Act was broader in
scope and "much easier to trigger" than the preceding 1915 law, which accorded dam-
ages and criminal sanctions against foreign companies that dumped).
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the FMV of dumped products., 4 First, the United States Department
of Treasury could base FMV on the price of goods sold in the export-
ers' home markets, 55 or, second, on a constructed value that the evalu-
ator derived from the sum of the costs of materials and fabrication plus
expenses and profits.56 The 1921 Act, however, provided no basis for
determining FMV of NME imports.57
In 1968, the Treasury Department issued the first regulations specifi-
cally focusing on foreign market valuation and non-market econo-
mies.58 Under these regulations, the Treasury Department constructed
the value of allegedly dumped products to determine FMV for goods
imported from NMEs.5 9 The Treasury Department did so by consider-
ing the sales price of comparable products from the non-state-con-
trolled or market economy country (surrogate)60 in either the surro-
gate's home market or in other countries including the United States.6 1
The Trade Act of 1974 (1974 Trade Act) codified this approach.6 2
Under the 1974 Trade Act, Congress provided a list of options for
determining FMV of NME goods. 3 First, the ITA could base FMV of
NME exports on the prices at which manufacturers in market economy
countries sold similar products in their own country or other countries
(the price method).6 4 Alternatively, the ITA could construct FMV us-
ing a market economy by considering the cost of materials needed to
54. Cuneo & Manual, supra note 49, at 282-83.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. S. Smith, The Treatment of Products from State-Controlled Economies under
the U.S. AntiDumping Law, in ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION
249 (1979). The 1921 Act is a free market law preserving the free market system. Id.
Congress did not design the law for products from non-market and state controlled
economies. Id.
58. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969). The Treasury handled dumping investigations until
1980, when it transferred such investigations to the DOC. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3396, 3399 (1979); Exec. Order No.
12,175, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3366 (1979).
59. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969).
60. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321(a), 88 Stat. 2043 (1975) (codi-
fying the 1968 regulations). The act does not use the word surrogate. Id. "Surrogate,"
however, refers to a market country that the ITA chooses to establish a market/non-
market comparison of prices and costs of dumped goods. Id.
61. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969).
62. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 321(a), 88 Stat. 2043, 2045 (1975).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: the Po-
lish Golf Cart Cases and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 224
(describing the 1974 Trade Act). The possibility of valuing NME prices by looking at
similar product prices in the United States, under § 321(a)(1)(B), appears to favor a
protectionist policy. Id. at 226-27. Use of American domestic prices as the standard of
fair value effectively eliminates state-controlled import competition. Id. at 226.
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produce the good, expenses and profits, and the cost of containers for
shipment of the product to the United States (the factors of production
method)." The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (1979 Trade Act),
which followed, changed the methodology of dumping investigations
rather 'than the substance of the FMV provision."
b. The current law regarding FMV calculations
In 1988, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act amended the
1979 Trade Act.6 7 The 1988 Trade Act significantly clarified the NME
country definition. 8 Under the new law, a NME country is any coun-
try where market principals of supply and demand fail to operate in
such a way that sales prices of products reflect the fair value of the
products' worth.69
The 1988 Trade Act also redesigned the basis for FMV calcula-
tions.70 Congress designated that the factors of production method
should be used to calculate FMV where feasible. Otherwise, the price
method should be used. 2 Under the factors of production method, the
ITA is required to consider factors such as labor hours, raw material
quantities, energy and utility consumption, and costs of capital invest-
65. Id. Although the act itself does not prefer the price method over the con-
structed value method, in practice the Treasury tended to favor the price method. Id.
66. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1671-78 (Supp. III 1979); see Comment, Implementation and Pol-
icy, supra note 52, at 1654 (stating that the 1979 Trade Act contributed to making the
dumping law conform with agreements reached at the Tokyo Round Multilateral
Trade Negotiations); TOKYo ROUND, supra note 5 (describing the decision reached
during the multilateral trade negotiation affecting the GATT).
67. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1108, 1186-87 § 1677(18) (1988).
68. Id.; see Verrill, supra note 28, at 432 (explaining that the new definition of
NME includes elements from previous laws). As criteria for NME status, the ne%
definition includes references to the workers' ability to bargain for wages and the
amount of government control over foreign investment. Id.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (1988). This subsection lists the following factors to
consider when determining whether a country has a NME: (i) the convertability of
foreign currency; (2) the degree to which free bargaining determines wage rates; (3)
the extent that other countries may invest in the state; and (4) the amount of govern-
ment control over the means of production, allocation of resources, and setting of
prices. Id.
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b) (1988).
71. Id. The act provides, in relevant part, that the ITA will calculate the FMV
based on the value of the factors of production that the country used to produce the
merchandise. Id. The value of these factors will include amounts for general expenses,
profits, and the cost of shipping containers and covers. Id. Under the act, the ITA may
base the costs of these factors on the BIA. Id.
72. Id. The ITA will resort to the price method only if the ITA finds that informa-
tion on factors is inadequate for calculating the FMV of goods. Id.
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ments.73 To value the factors the ITA must choose a surrogate country
which is a significant producer of the relevant merchandise and has a
market economy at a level of economic development comparable to the
NME country.74 Urea from the USSR75 illustrates most profoundly the
application of the Trade Act and the difficulties of establishing FMV in
a NME.
II. A RECENT CASE BEFORE THE ITA CONCERNING
NME DUMPING: UREA FROM THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In Urea from the USSR, the ITA calculated FMV based on the fac-
tors of production method.76 Although the ITA decided Urea before the
enactment of the 1988 Trade Act, the ITA applied the law as if it was
already in place.77 The case provided the impetus for the changes in the
1988 Trade Act. 8
In Urea, the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Nitrogen Producers
(petitioners) filed a petition with the ITA on July 16, 1986.7' The peti-
tioners contended that the major Soviet urea producer was selling urea
at LTFV80 and that the imported products caused or threatened to
cause material injury to the United States fertilizer industry.8 1 After
73. Id. § 1667.
74. Id. Although the act does not refer to the market economy as a surrogate, it is
in essence a surrogate. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the con-
cept of surrogate). The ITA values the factors by looking at the costs of factors in the
chosen surrogate market. 19 U.S.C. § 1667(c) (4) (1988).
75. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
76. Id.
77. Id. The ITA decided Urea when the applicable law preferred the price method
for FMV calculations. Id. Nevertheless, the ITA exercised its discretion and applied
the factors of production method. Id.
78. Verrill, supra note 28, at 434. The Urea decision played an important role in
Congress' decision to make the factors of production method the primary method for
determining FMV in a NME antidumping investigation where adequate factor data is
available. Id.
79. Urea, 52 Fed. Reg. 124 (1987) (preliminary determination).
80. Id., Petition on Behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee of Domestic Nitrogen Pro-
ducers 2 (July 16, 1986) (Inv. No. A-461-601) [hereinafter Petition]. This case was
brought in conjunction with urea cases from the German Democratic Republic and
Romania. Id. This article will only discuss the USSR case.
81. Id. at 41. The petitioner stated that the American urea industry suffered mate-
rial injury as shown by a substantial decrease in domestic manufacturing, employment,
sales, and profitability. Id. Petitioner demonstrated that, in 1985 and 1986, domestic
production of urea declined while American consumption of urea rose. Id. Further,
domestic capacity for production decreased 90.7% in the first half of 1985 and 67.3%
in the second half. Id. at 43. Meanwhile, domestic urea inventories accumulated, evi-
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reviewing the petition, the ITA found that it contained sufficient infor-
mation for the ITA to proceed with an antidumping investigation."2
The ITA formally began the investigation on August 5, 1986.83 Follow-
ing publication of the initiation proceedings, the ITA presented eight
questionnaires to United States importers who acted on behalf of the
Soviet government.84 Although the ITA extended the questionnaire re-
sponse period pursuant to the regulations, the ITA received only one
response from the major Soviet exporter, Sojuzpromexport.85 The ITA
limited the scope of the investigation to solid urea and did not investi-
gate other fertilizer solutions.8
B. FAIR VALUE COMPARISON
In its final determination, the ITA made a LTFV calculation by
comparing the United States price to the FMV of Soviet urea.87 In
making this calculation, the ITA chose the United Kingdom (UK) as
the appropriate surrogate country. 8 The ITA selected the UK because
both the UK and the USSR produce urea in significant quantities. 89
dencing a lack of sales and decrease in profits. Id. at 45-46. The petitioner also showed
that Soviet producers' predatory pricing of urea imports lowered prices of urea within
the United States. Id.
82. 52 Fed. Reg. 124 (1987).
83. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,857 (initiation 1986).
84. 52 Fed. Reg. 125 (1987); see Letter and Questionnaire from ITA to Sojuz-
promexport (Oct. 10, 1986) (instructing Soviet exporters to answer and return the
questionnaires within thirty-seven days). The questionnaires contained questions about
corporate structure, distribution systems, accounting practices, merchandise, quantity
and value of sales, documentation, sales to the United States, charges, adjustments for
discounts and rebates, exporters' sales price, transactions, commission offsets, and
terms of payment. Id.
85. 52 Fed. Reg. 125 (1987).
86. Id.
87. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987). In making its calculation, the ITA looked at all
sales of urea from January 1 to June 30, 1986. Id.
88. 52 Fed. Reg. 125 (1987). The ITA concluded, after investigating several urea
producing countries, that the UK was the best surrogate choice. Id.; see Memorandum
from Francis McFaul to Michael Coursey (Oct. 3, 1986) (concerning urea from the
USSR). The letter described the ITA's choice of the UK as the proper surrogate. Id.
The ITA based its decision on World Bank and CIA statistics. Id. The ITA chose the
UK because, like the USSR, the UK produced natural gas, a major component in urea
manufacturing. Id. If the UK had not cooperated with the investigation, the ITA would
have chosen New Zealand, with Italy and then France as alternative surrogates. Id. at
2.
89. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,560 (1987). Respondent objected to the ITA's choice of the
UK as a surrogate claiming that lesser developed countries would provide a better sur-
rogate comparison to the USSR. Id. Respondent urged the ITA to choose a surrogate
from such countries as Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Id. Respondent
based its suggestion on raw material supplies, income comparability, and the size of the
agricultural sectors of these urea producing and consuming nations. Id.
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Furthermore, the ITA sent a questionnaire and obtained a response
from a major British producer of urea, Imperial Chemical Industries. 0
After designating the UK as the surrogate country, the ITA focused
its investigation on two major exporters of urea to the United States:
Philipp Brothers and Sojuzpromexport. 91 To make the LTFV compari-
son, the ITA analyzed data from sales of these two exporters and made
separate LTFV calculations for each company. 92 The ITA chose to
make separate LTFV calculations based on arguments from Philipp
Brothers in its post-hearing brief.93 Philipp Brothers asserted that the
ITA should calculate separate LTFV comparisons for trading compa-
nies who know their products are destined for the United States and for
manufacturers who lack this knowledge.94 In its final determination,
the agency established individual dumping margins for Sojuz-
promexport and Philipp Brothers.95
C. UNITED STATES PRICE
In its LTFV analysis, the ITA made several preliminary considera-
tions for determining the United States price and FMV.9 8 To deter-
mine the United States price, the ITA used both the exporter's sales
price and the purchase price. 9 The ITA used the exporter's sales price
90. 52 Fed. Reg. 125 (1987); see Memorandum to File, Urea from the USSR
(Dec. 12, 1986) (statement of Gilbert Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the
United States Import Administration) (suggesting the United Kingdom as a proper
surrogate because it was willing to cooperate).
91. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Brief for Respondent, Philipp Brothers LTD and Philipp Brothers Inc. at 1-2
(submitted May 8, 1987) (Inv. No. A-461-601) [hereinafter Brief for Philipp Broth-
ers]. The respondent claimed that the Roller Chain determination holds that when
manufacturers and trading companies are unrelated, the ITA should make separate
dumping calculations. Id.; cf. Roller Chain Other than Bicycle from Japan: Prelimi-
nary Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Finding and Tentative Deter-
mination to Revoke in Part, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,673 (1983). The respondent asserted that
the ITA cannot compare United States price and cost of acquisition when calculating
fair value for trading companies existing independently of the manufacturers. Id. at 4.
Philipp Brothers, however, urged the ITA to use the trading company's price to third
countries instead of the manufacturer's home market price. Id. at 3.
95. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Id. In its preliminary determination, the ITA used only the purchase price paid
for solid urea from Sojuzpromexport as the United States price. 52 Fed. Reg. at 125
(1987). The ITA further modified the United States price by calculating the purchase
price based on the price to unrelated purchasers and deducting charges for inland
freight, brokerage and loading. Id. The ITA based these deductions on prices found in
a non-state-controlled economy. Id.
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for sales from Sojuzpromexport to Philipp Brothers.9 The ITA did so
because it determined that the Soviet urea producers did not know that
the urea's final destination was the United States 9 After applying the
exporter's sales calculation for determining the United States price the
ITA further factored in relevant deductions.100
D. FMV
1. The USSR as a NME Country
Before proceeding with a FMV calculation, the ITA determines
whether a country's economy is state-controlled and, thus, whether the
NME law is applicable.10' In Urea, the ITA first determined that the
USSR had a state controlled economy and then applied the NME an-
tidumping law.102
2. The FMV Calculation
In Urea, the ITA attempted to use the price method for computing
FMV. 0 3 To implement this method, the ITA sought price data from
Imperial Chemical Industries,"' by sending a questionnaire 0 5 and vis-
98. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987). See supra note 41 (explaining the definitional dif-
ferences between exporters' sales price and purchase price when calculating the United
States price).
99. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,560 (1987). The ITA believed Sojuzpromexport was unaware
of its product's destination because the contract between Philipp Brothers and Sojuz-
promexport listed several possible destinations for Soviet urea. Id. In addition, Philipp
Brothers, in its general practice, sells urea to importers other than those in the United
States. Id.
100. Id. at 19,557. Exporter price deductions included port handling and loading
charges, credit, and other expenses involved in selling products in the United States. Id.
The ITA estimated port handling expenses by examining costs of port handling to sur-
rogates. Id.; see Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,434, 29,435
(1984) (holding that the ITA should base the port handling on costs for these expenses
in market economies).
101. See supra note 9 (defining NME).
102. 52 Fed Reg. 19,557 (1987). Compare Urea 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987) (of-
fering a brief discussion of the USSR's NME status) with Final Determination of
Sales at Less than Fair Value; Certain Headwear from the People's Republic of
China, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,983 (1989) [hereinafter Headwear] (containing a lengthy dis-
cussion of whether the ITA should consider China a NME for purposes of this investi-
gation). The respondent in Headwear urged the ITA to use the law applicable to mar-
ket economies in its investigation of the Chinese headwear industry's alleged dumping.
Id. at 11,987. The ITA held that China's headwear industry was state-controlled, al-
though it recognized that the degree of government control over inputs and outputs
provided a "mixed picture" of state controlled and market forces. Id. at 11,984.
103. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987); see supra note 60-64 and accompanying text
(describing the price method).
104. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
105. Id.
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iting the firm's English plants.1"6 The ITA, however, failed to gather
enough information to calculate FMV based on UK prices.1 07 Because
of the deficient data, the ITA decided instead to employ the factors of
production method.108 Although the ITA chose the factors of produc-
tion method, it still lacked data on Soviet factors and employed the
best information available calculation. 109
Despite the ITA's preference for the factors of production method in
both its preliminary and final determinations, the petitioners and re-
spondents debated the method's applicability, revealing the benefits and
costs of both the factors of production and the price method."10 The
petitioner argued that the agency should determine FMV based on fac-
tors of production,"' a urging the ITA to evaluate the factors by invok-
ing the BIA rule." 2 Petitioner favored the BIA calculation because of
the ITA's failure to verify important Soviet cost and price
information." 3
106.. 52 Fed. Reg. 125 (1987).
107. Id.
108. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987); see supra note 71 and accompanying text
(describing the use of the factors of production method).
109. See supra notes 65 and 74 and accompanying text (restating a description of
the factor method); supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing when the ITA
invokes the BIA rule). The Code does not define BIA, but states that it includes such
information supporting a petition or provided by an interested party to the action. 19
C.F.R. § 353.37 (1989); Post hearing Brief for Petitioner (submitted May 8, 1987)
(Inv. No. A-461-601) 25-36 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner] (complaining in Urea
that the ITA could not fully verify price data despite a verification that took place in
Moscow during the end of March 1987). Petitioner contended that the Soviet's inabil-
ity to report actual quantities, credit expenses, and amount of total sales made it para-
mount for the ITA to invoke the BIA rule for determing the United States price. Id. In
Urea, the ITA noted that it relied on public sources for the UK values of gas, electric-
ity and labor. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,558 (1987). When these public sources were unavaila-
ble, the ITA relied on information provided in the petition. Id.
110. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,561 (1987).
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 109, at 13; see Anti-Dumping Hearing on
Urea from the USSR (Inv. No. A-461-601) (Apr. 28, 1987) 62 (statement of Valerie
Slater, attorney for petitioner) (warning the ITA to use the factors of production
method separate and apart from the constructed values method). If the two methods
were used together, the ITA would need to adjust factors depreciation in the UK, and
would need to adjust the UK prices for the Soviet Union experience. Id. at 62-63. This
is essentially "mixing your apples and oranges." Id.
112. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 109, at 5-6. Petitioner contends that the ITA
failed to verify the following factor data provided by the Soviet producer: (1) actual
usage (Soviet respondent provided data only on standard usage); (2) information pro-
vided on financial statements or plant construction dates; (3) labor statistics concerning
the number of workers and indirect labor costs; (4) information on depreciation rates.
Id.
113. Id. at 11. Petitioner pointed out that the ITA received incorrect information
and in some important instances received no data at all on the costs of Soviet factors.
Id. When the Soviet producers failed to provide the needed information, the petitioner
provided supplementary data in its brief to determine the costs of factors. Id. at
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In opposition to the petitioner's argument, the respondents urged the
ITA to use the price method because the ITA had used that method in
previous cases.114 Respondent Philipp Brothers requested that the ITA
base the FMV on the average prices of a sample of market imports.115
Respondent noted, however, that if the ITA chose to use the factors of
production method, the calculation should reflect market conditions
and not rely on the BIA rule"' because this method would overstate
the factors costs.
117
Despite respondent's arguments, the ITA chose to use the factors of
production method for several reasons. 18 First, the ITA claimed that
the price method was inappropriate because it appeared that the large
amount of urea exported from NME companies had affected urea
prices throughout the world.'1 9 Using the price method would reflect
NME prices and not the sought after market influenced prices. Second,
if the ITA used the price method, it would have difficulty isolating
prices to provide a useful non-market/market comparison for this time
period.120 Third, the ITA decided against the price method because, in
Appendix.
For example, during the verification of the Cherkassy plant in the Ukraine, the ITA
failed to uncover information on plant costs and financing. FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
VERIFICATION REPORTS, CHERKASSY IN THE UKRAINE 5 (1987). Although the plant's
clerk prepares annual and monthly financial reports for the fertilizer ministry, the com-
pany refused to allow ITA officials to review these reports. Id. at 6. The ITA did verify
information on raw materials used in production, labor rates, number of plant facilities,
and production. Id. The ITA received similar results from the verification at the
Odessa plant, which is also located in the Ukraine. FACTORS OF PRODUCTION VERIFI-
CATION REPORTS, ODESSA 7 (1987).
114. Brief for Philipp Brothers, supra note 94, at 9-10; Post Hearing Brief for Re-
spondents Ameropa A.G., Cargill Inc., Conagra Fertilizer Co., Contichem, Inc., Helm
Fertilizer Corporation, Kairchem International Corp., Mitsui & Co., Inc. and Occiden-
tal Chemical Agricultural Products Inc. 2-13 (submitted May 8. 1987).
115. Brief of Philipp Brothers, supra note 94, at 9-10. The law firm of Steptoce &
Johnson submitted a paper describing the market basket method. Id.
116. Id. at 9-11. The DOC's use of the BIA rule for valuing factors of production
imposes a punitive levy upon Soviet importers (or exporters) because these importers
could not know what standard the ITA would apply when annually reviewing compa-
nies for dumping violations. Id. at 10. The importers do not know the standard because
cost information is extremely sensitive, and the BIA changes radically from one case to
another. Id.
117. Id. at 11. Respondent claimed that petitioner's assertion that the Soviets are
high cost producers is unfounded. Id. The Soviet Union's large supply of natural gas
and superior plant conditions reveal that the Soviets can effectively produce urea at
lower costs than countries lacking such raw material supplies. Id.
118. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
119. Id. at 19,559. In response to one of petitioner's comments urging the use of
the factor method, the ITA stated that producers' inability to separate pricing and
supply decisions from market demand conditions has contributed to the distortion of
worldwide urea prices. Id.
120. Id. There were not enough foreign suppliers available to provide needed price
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this case, the Soviet and UK producers provided insufficient price
data.12'
Once the ITA chose the factors of production method over the price
method, it still had problems determining the basis for the factors.'22
To begin its analysis, the ITA determined that the USSR produced
urea in thirty-six plants. 12 3 From among these thirty-six plants, the
ITA obtained sample data from six, and verified the data from two of
the six plants. 2 4 To make its determination, the ITA then averaged the
costs of factors from these two plants.1
25
Despite an attempt to further verify this data, the ITA had to use
the BIA to value certain factors.2 6 The ITA noted that it could not
quantify or appropriately value certain factors from the UK's informa-
tion. 27 In these instances, the ITA used the most reliable objective in-
formation contained in the investigation record, depending heavily on
data from the petitioner's brief.a28 After calculating FMV, the ITA
confirmed its preliminary determination decision, holding that no criti-
cal circumstances existed.' 29 Although the ITA found some increase in




Urea illustrates the complexity of applying the 1988 Trade Act to
NME cases. For each calculation, the ITA made a variety of choices
that significantly affected the final determination of whether dumping
data because such suppliers imported amounts too small for investigation purposes or
were already under an antidumping investigation, or the governments of these foreign
countries provided subsidies to the industries in question. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 19,558.
123. Id. at 19,557-58.




128. Id. For example, the ITA derived the Soviet factors from supplemental reports
on factor costs provided in the petitioner's brief. Id. In its final determination, the
agency revealed the extent that it relied on outside sources to obtain values for certain
factors. Id. Outside reports included the Fertilizer Manual, Energy Prices and Taxes,
and Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Chemicals and Allied
Products Manufacturing. Id. In addition, the ITA determined the value of natural gas
from Gasoline NV, a gas board for the Netherlands, and the UK labor rates from
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had occurred.' As a consequence of the numerous decisions made
during the application of the factors of production method, the ITA
failed to provide other NME companies with guidelines for predicting
when the agency will impose dumping duties in other cases.'32 The
ITA's failure to supply a set standard makes it virtually impossible for
a NME company to determine if its actions will constitute a violation
until well after the ITA has begun an investigation of the company. 33
Thus, like prior antidumping legislation, the 1988 Trade Act fails to
provide predictability in highly technical and important dumping
determinations.
3 4
Despite the new law, the ITA still must determine whether a country
has a NME, whether the price or factors of production method should
apply, whether a surrogate is properly chosen, and whether it can ver-
ify the data it gathers to complete its investigation.' Not surprisingly,
results from such a system will remain unpredictable unless Congress
legislates further changes in the law. 36
1. LTFV Comparison
In Urea, the inherent complications of applying the antidumping law
are revealed most profoundly in the ITA's LTFV comparison and FMV
131. See supra notes 93, 97, 108, 118, 124 and accompanying text (deciphering the
choices the ITA made for each leg of the calculations).
132. See infra note 133 (illustrating why the Urea case provides no application in
other proceedings). Arguments against the price method are equally applicable here.
Verrill, supra note 28, at 427 (emphasizing that prior to the 1988 Trade Act, critics of
the price method felt that use of prices did not provide predictability in similar cases);
Chen, supra note 28, at 736 (explaining that the price method made it difficult for
exporters to value their exports so as to avoid dumping duties and difficult for import-
ers to predict whether to add additional costs to the goods as duties).
133. See S. REP., supra note 13, at 108 (stating that often the DOC cannot find
surrogate producers who will cooperate with investigations). The DOC employs alter-
native methods when a surrogate is uncooperative. Id. Therefore, the ITA may esti-
mate varying dumping margins for similar NME cases based on the choice of surrogate
methodology used in a specific case. Id. Hence, a NME cannot plan its production
activities to avoid possible dumping duties. Id.
134. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, § 1316 (1988). The new law changed
the previous act by preferring the factors of production method over the price method.
Id. The act did not abolish the price method, but simply made it the second available
choice after the factors method for calculating FMV. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th
Cong. Ist Sess. 590, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADIIN. NEws 1548, 1623-
24 (1988). The Conferees intended the ITA to value factors of non-subsidized prices,
yet they did not expect the ITA to extensively investigate whether the government
dumped or subsidized such prices. Id. Instead, the Conferees expected the DOC to use
information that was generally available. Id.
135. See supra note 131 (listing the choices made by the ITA in Urea).
136. But see Verrill, supra note 28, at 436 (concluding, in reference to the 1988
Trade Act, that "a relatively predictable methodology has emerged").
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calculations. When calculating LTFV, the ITA first decides whether to
undertake separate calculations for unrelated exporters and trading
companies. 13 7 In Urea, the ITA chose to calculate two LTFV compari-
sons because the two exporters, Sojuzpromexport and Philipp Brothers,
operated independently of one another. 3 ' The ITA's decision, however,
has no value as a precedent because the ITA fails to assert that divid-
ing unrelated purchasers from trading companies will be the rule in
similar cases. 139
In its LTFV comparison, the ITA also faces the question of a coun-
try's status as a market or nonmarket economy. 4 ° In Urea, the ITA
decided with limited discussion that the USSR had a NME for pur-
poses of the investigation.' "" Yet, unlike Urea, the NME decision may
present complex problems. 42 The ITA sometimes encounters an ex-
porting country in which the economy intermingles market forces with
non-market forces. 43 Some countries with socialist and communist gov-
ernments do not have pure NMEs.'" Instead, certain sectors of the
economy are rigidly controlled by the state, while other sectors of the
economy operate with substantial free market influences. 14 As several
137. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (espousing the importance of under-
taking separate less than fair value calculations for unrelated exporting entities).
138. Id.
139. See Brief for Philipp Brothers, supra note 94, at 6-7 (urging the ITA to un-
dertake separate LTFV calculations for Philipp Brothers as a predictable method). The
Respondent emphasized this approach because it applies "normal dumping procedures
whenever possible." Id. at 7.
140. See GLOSSARY, supra note 37. To begin a LTFV comparison, in deciding if a
country has a NME, the ITA checks whether a country's government controls the
economy and looks for the existence or non-existence of free market forces of supply
and demand. Id.
141. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987); see Petition, supra note 80, at 2 (stating that the
USSR has a non-market economy because production, investment, and pricing plans in
the USSR are not subject to commercial considerations (profits) as found in market
economies). The petitioner most appropriately questioned why the ITA makes separate
calculations for NME and market economies. Id. Petitioner claimed that when NME
producers sell products in the free market countries, their presence can destroy the
normal functioning of the marketplace. Id.
142. Petition, supra note 80, at 2.
143. See Headwear, supra note 102, at 11,983 (using China's headwear industry to
illustrate an economic sector containing both market and non-market forces). While
the ITA may generally consider China a NME country, market forces do exist in its
headwear sector. Id. Although the state outwardly controls the Chinese headwear in-
dustry, the following market forces are also at work: the producers' ability to purchase
cotton cloth outside the government plan; the employees' status based on profits; pro-
ducers' and manufacturers' ability to negotiate prices with suppliers; and the choice of
where to export headwear products and at what prices. Id.
144. See Chen, supra note 28, at 742 (claiming that no country has either an ex-
clusively free market or NME). Countries differ as to which and how many economic
sectors the government controls. Id.
145. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STUDY OF CHINA'S NEW MARKET ORIENTA-
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of the traditional NME countries undergo economic reform, the inade-
quacy of the United States trade law for dealing with this phenomenon
becomes even more apparent. 46 Additionally, the law does not account
for the increasing capitalistic factors found in certain economies.,4
2. Complexities in Determining FMV
When calculating the FMV of a NME product, the ITA faces two
issues: first, whether the ITA has chosen a proper surrogate, and, sec-
ond, whether the ITA can verify enough information in time for the
investigation.'48 The choice of the surrogate producer is extremely im-
portant because, whether utilizing the price or factors of production
method, the ITA uses a surrogate country to value monetary terms.149
The problem with the surrogate rule is finding the surrogate and, once
found, compelling that country to provide needed data.150 For example,
in Urea, the ITA chose the UK as the proper surrogate to the
USSR.15' The briefs of the two respondents and the ITA's own file,
suggest that the ITA could easily have chosen surrogate countries other
TION & U.S. TRADE LAWS, Aug. 1989 [hereinafter NEW MARKET ORIENTATION]
(describing the reforms in China's economy affecting the application of the 1988 Trade
Act to companies existing in these newly oriented NMEs). The problem with these
newly evolving NMEs is articulated best as follows: "an economy may be found to be
more market oriented under some of the factors and somewhat or not at all market
oriented under others, depending on the product being investigated." Id. at 6. Because
of this phenomenon, the ITA must apply antidumping laws on an individual case basis,
"lending uncertainty to the administrative process." Id.
146. See Verrill, supra note 28, at 432 (revealing that the new Trade Act's defini-
tion of a NME is no longer "facially ideological" so as to include only Communist
countries). Arguably, countries such as China and Hungary can object to the ITA
classifying them as having NMEs. Id.
147. See NEw MARKET ORIENTATION, supra note 145, at 158 (revealing that
China is not the only country which poses problems for the ITA). The ITA must apply
its law to deal effectively with other countries which although traditionally classified as
NME countries, now due to economic reform, have economies in transition. Id. The
problem with the present law is that it only deals with non-market and market econo-
mies without coping with the "gray" area for economies that are moving from a non-
market orientation to greater market orientation. Id.
148. See S. REP., supra note 13, at 106 (discussing complications in choosing sur-
rogates and verifying data).
149. See supra note 60 (describing a surrogate).
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing the unpredictability of
the surrogate mechanism within the antidumping laws); see also Alfred, When is
China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application of the AntiDumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy"
Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 81 (1987) (denouncing the legal fiction the ITA cre-
ates through its use of a surrogate, whereby the ITA analogizes one country to another
for purposes of the foreign market value calculation).
151. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557-58 (1987).
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than the UK.'52
The problem of verification is linked to the ITA's dependence on a
surrogate country. 53 Even when a surrogate agrees to answer a ques-
tionnaire, the ITA must determine if the responses are correct and
based on similar accounting standards, such as American price or cost
data. 54 Further, the ITA must work within the time constraints of the
law. 155 If a surrogate country fails to provide essential data on time, the
ITA turns to alternative means of valuing prices or costs.156 Yet, even
if exporters provide all necessary data, the ITA still chooses which data
it will ultimately verify, making calculations even less predictable.5
Urea provides an excellent example of this randomness. 58 In Urea,
despite the ITA's choice of the factors of production methodology and
the UK as a surrogate, the ITA still had difficulty obtaining and verify-
ing essential data from the USSR to calculate the cost of factors. 15
When valuing factors, the ITA used information from a multitude of
sources. 6 0 Although the law requires the ITA to use the BIA in these
instances, this does not necessarily mean the ITA possesses the strong-
est information for its calculations. 16'
152. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (assessing the ITA's choice of the
UK as the proper surrogate).
153. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (considering the problems the
ITA faces at verification).
154. S. REP., supra note 13, at 107-08. The proposed changes in the trade law
avoided use of the price method due to problems of predicting, gathering, and verifying
this information. Id.
155. 19 C.F.R. § 353.36 (1989).
156. Id. § 353.37.
157. Id. § 353.36(a)(2). If the ITA determines that the amount of verifiable data is
too large, the agency may choose a smaller sample to verify. Id.
158. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557 (1987).
159. Id. at 19,558. The ITA could not quantify certain factors and could not ap-
propriately value other factors from the UK data. Id. at 19,557. In these cases, the
ITA used the most reliable objective information in the records of the investigation. Id.;
see contra Comprehensive Trade Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3 Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 893
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ad Hoc Comm. Domestic Nitrogen Pro-
ducers and Independent Refiners Coalitions on Proposed Trade Law Reform) (refer-
ring to the use of the factors of production method in Urea). Implementation of the
factors of production method in Urea reveals that, although the Soviets do not use
capital, materials, and labor efficiently, they nevertheless sell urea in American markets
at prices significantly below their own production costs. Id. The main advantage of the
factors of production method is that it recognizes the NME's actual production effi-
ciencies but values them against verifiable market prices. Id.
160. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,558 (1987). The ITA's supplementary sources included public
reports on fertilizer costs, information on the Netherlands' tariffs, public sources for
UK labor rates, and an ITA-generated ratio for overhead factory costs. Id.
161. 19 C.F.R. § 353.37 (1989).
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B. AMERICAN PROPOSALS
Over the years, critics of the United States antidumping law have
offered several proposals for calculating the FMV of NME products.
6 2
Before passage of the 1988 Trade Act, Congress evaluated several of
these proposals.163 After careful analysis of the problem, Congress
adopted the factors of production method in an attempt to solve the
difficult evaluation problems inherent in trade with NMEs.' The fol-
lowing NME proposals provided alternatives to the present Act.
1. Artificial Price Benchmark Proposals
Two proposals urged the continuing use of the price method for cal-
culating FMV. 65 Advocates of these proposals suggested, in different
variations, establishing an artificial benchmark price of a particular
good against which to compare NME prices. 6 First, the Reagan Ad-
ministration suggested using the lowest import price of goods received
from market economies as the benchmark price.'67 The second varia-
tion proposed the use of the average import price of the highest volume
market economy importer. 6 ' Prices below this artificial benchmark
would result in the imposition of dumping duties against the NME
company.'69
The question inherent in these two suggestions is whether it is fair to
compare NME import prices with either the average or lowest import
prices of market economy goods.'70 The use of an artificial benchmark
162. See generally Hearings, supra note 159 (providing statements criticizing prior
legislation).
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 65 and 73-74 and accompanying text (describing the factors
methodology).
165. See Hearings, supra note 159, at 648, 656 (1987) (statements of Gilbert B.
Kaplan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration and Alan F. Holmer,
General Counsel, United States Trade Representative's Office).
166. Id. at 649.
167. Id. at 653. The Reagan Administration supported this proposal firsi because it
seemed more fair and more reliable than constructing the prices or factors of goods. Id.
Second, the Administration also wished to avoid intimidating NME companies into
pulling their goods out of American markets. A. WOODS & B. SMART, ADMINISTRA-
TION COMMENTS ON PROPOSED ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DuTv AmENID-
MENTS 2 (1987). Third, the Administration favored using the lowest import prices as
the benchmark because NME goods generally receive lower prices than market econ-
omy goods sold in the American economy. Verrill, supra note 28, at 430-31.
168. S. REP. supra note 13, at 106.
169. Id.
170. Hearings, supra note 159, at 893. One criticism of the Administration's
method is that it would allow NME producers to sell at the benchmark prices even
without proving that the NME company was the lowest producer. Id. Likewise, the
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price fails to reflect real costs within the NME.' 7 1 Further, benchmark
prices do not abolish the problem of establishing a FMV through the
use of a surrogate.
72
2. Market Disruption
The market disruption system allows the president, prior to a full
dumping investigation, to restrict imports from communist countries
that threaten to injure domestic industries. 1 3 The president may use
this provision whenever communist countries export large quantities of
goods to the United States that disrupt the United States' market.14
Prior to passage of the 1988 Trade Act, commentators suggested
changes to the market disruption provision, including a proposal to
make the provision the sole law applicable to NME companies that
dump their products. 17 5 Critics of this proposal, however, argued that it
would severely discourage NME exports to the United States. 1' 6 The
1988 Trade Act, therefore, did not enact the market disruption rule as
the sole provision to apply against NMEs.'"
3. Creating a New Category for Planned Market Economies
Another proposal suggested changing the law to account for the dif-
ferences inherent in various NME countries .1  This proposal took into
average import benchmark would provide a "safe harbor" for N'ME companies who do
not produce goods at average prices. Id. The proposed price benchmark approach is
arbitrary and potentially unfair to nonmarket economies. Id. (statement of Aerospace
Industries Association of America).
171. Id.
172. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,557-58 (1987); see supra note 89 and accompanying text
(describing the problem with using a surrogate in Urea).
173. See supra note 52 (describing the § 406 market disruption provision).
174. Id.
175. Hearings, supra note 159.
176. Id.
177. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1241, § 1411 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1988)).
178. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of
applying one NME law to different NME countries). This proposal attempted to distin-
guish between countries with economies as divergent as China and the Soviet Union.
Id.; see Hearings, supra note 159, at 612 (statement of Edward Furia, Committee for
Fair Trade with China) (stating that reforms in China's economy since 1979 have cre-
ated market forces within the state controlled economy to such an extent that the ITA
should not "rigidly" label China a NME along with such countries as Cuba, North
Korea, and the USSR). Furia states that it is unfair to group China along with these
other NME countries because China's economy shows signs of change. Id. The current
law, which does not account for China's new economic status, appears unfair because
when China penetrates United States' markets, it immediately faces dumping duties.
Id.; see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
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account the fact that some expanding NME countries have market and
nonmarket forces within the same economic system."' 0 The Committee
for Fair Trade with China (CFTC) proposed the establishment of a
new provision to deal with NMEs that are in transition. 80 The CFTC
proposed the addition of another category to dumping legislation. for
planned market economies such as China.181 Under the CFTC propo-
sal, the ITA would calculate FMV of goods from a planned economy
based on costs of factors that have market components. 82 To value fac-
tors where the production reveals non-market forces, the ITA would
use a representative world price. 
18 3
The planned economy proposal, therefore, suggests that the ITA
needs to create new categories of NMEs to account for the varying
stages of NME evolution. 8" This creates an administrative problem be-
cause the ITA will continually need to create new categories for coun-
tries at different stages of free market development. 85 Furthermore,
the CFTC proposal requires Congress to delve into a complex analysis
to segregate market forces from non-market forces within a particular
economy."8 6
AcTIVE SINCE I/1/80 (1989) (acknowledging the fact that the ITA investigated seven-
teen dumping cases against China between 1980 and 1989). Within this same time
period, the ITA investigations for other NME countries were not nearly so numerous.
Id.; see Han Xu, U.S. Laws Threaten the Future of China-U.S. Trade, CHINEsE Bus.
REv. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1986) (arguing that United States trade laws unfairly apply to
China); Competitive Challenges Facing United States Industry Before the Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 100th Cong., 123 (1987) (statement of
Milledge A. Hart III) (testifying that the current law hurts China's ability to trade
with the United States).
179. See note 143 and accompanying text (discussing this dual phenomenon found
in the Chinese economy).
180. Hearings, supra note 159, at 615-24.
181. Id. at 638. The CFTC defines a planned market economy as:
[A]ny foreign country whose government has been determined by the adminis-
tering authority to have announced and to be implementing economic reforms of
a kind that, when fully implemented, will have brought the foreign country to a
state where its cost and pricing structures are primarily influenced by market
principles so that sales of merchandise in such country will reflect the fair value
of the merchandise.
Id.
182. Id. at 635.
183. Id. The proposal suggests that the ITA will divide elements of a good into
portions whose production involves market forces and portions whose production in-
volves non-market forces. Id. at 617.
184. Id. at 617-18.
185. See id. at 664-65 (statement of Kaplan) (testifying that the CFTC approach
is unworkable as a trade law). The CFTC plan requests that Congress legislate to push
China toward trade reform rather than provide relief for American industry. Id. at
665. This is not the goal of antidumping legislation. Id.; see generally supra notes 5-7
and accompanying text (enunciating the purpose of antidumping laws).
186. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
An analysis of the application in Urea of the NME methodology,
adopted in the 1988 Trade Act, reveals that the present law has failed
to simplify the procedures for determining when a NME company
dumps its products in the United States. 87 This section provides rec-
ommendations for improvements in the trade law, through an incorpo-
ration of previous proposals, to make the law more predictable and eas-
ier to apply.188 The following recommendations present a wide range of
proposals; it may not be beneficial to implement all such changes at one
time.
Congress should first severely limit the number of variables within a
FMV calculation. 189 The factors of production method in the Trade
Act has merit, however, and should remain intact, but stricter rules
should govern the ITA's application of the law.190 For example, to
make the law more predictable for NME companies, Congress should
establish a set list matching market economy countries with NME
countries for the ITA to use when valuing factors of production.' By
establishing such a list, a NME company could estimate factor values
to determine if it had violated American trade law prior to
exportation.' 92
To further increase the law's predictability, Congress must standard-
ize the BIA rule.193 Instead of allowing the ITA to employ any data it
sees fit to use,'94 Congress should require the ITA to use only data with
a high probability of verification. In addition, data acquired under the
BIA rule should consist of information that appears to roughly corre-
spond with data needed for valuing factors. At present, when the ITA
has insufficient data to calculate FMV, it first uses the data provided
by the petitioner. 98 The automatic use of petitioner's information cre-
ates a bias in the calculation. Instead, the ITA should develop a proce-
dure wherein disinterested parties obtain data on costs of factors and
187. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (reviewing the law's problems
as applied in Urea).
188. See supra notes 165-186 and accompanying text (listing these proposals).
189. See supra note 131 (listing the many choices the ITA must make in a NME
dumping decision as exemplified in Urea).
190. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1316(b)(18), 102 Stat. 1107, 4143 (1988).
191. See supra note 133 (suggesting that a law based on surrogates fails for lack of
predictability).
192. See id. (explaining why the law's predictability would help NME companies).
193. 19 C.F.R. § 353.37 (1989).
194. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (setting forth the BIA rule).
195. 19 C.F.R. § 353.37 (1989).
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comparable surrogates.
In order to simplify the ITA's application of the law, Congress could
sharpen the verification procedures. 19 6 Sanctions or penalties might
compel NME manufacturers to turn data over to the ITA more read-
ily. The ITA's use of treaties or other international agreements would
also be helpful. Such treaties would establish the principle that a coun-
try's trade with the United States is conditioned on the country's com-
pliance with providing the ITA with the requested data. Congress could
then penalize the NMEs with more severe dumping duties if these
countries fail to provide needed data.1
97
Finally, a better NME dumping law must account for the changes in
evolving NME countries. 9 8 The CFTC introduces a valid concern
about using the same law to apply to all NMEs. 9 Further, economic
and political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries
indicate that the governments of these countries may reduce control
over their respective economies.2 °0 When such developments occur, the
law should account for the market and non-market forces within a sin-
gle economic sector.21 To solve these problems, Congress should be
prepared to create new categories of laws to apply to countries in which
a mix of market and non-market forces exist.20 2
Congress could also change the law so as to investigate dumping on a
196. Id. § 353.36.
197. See supra note 2 (describing the calculation of dumping duties under present
law).
198. See note 181 (discussing the proposal for creating a planned market
economy).
199. Id.
200. M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMIRNOv, THE REORGANIZATION OF SovIET FOR-
EIGN TRADE Vii (S. Legitsky ed. 1989). Due to the Soviet policy of perestroika, the
government has reorganized foreign trade firms. Id. These firms have more "manage-
rial autonomy," self-financing and full cost accountability. Id. Although central govern-
ment supervision over the foreign trade organizations still exists, there is no direct gov-
ernment interference in day to day operations. Id. at x. According to Soviet analysts of
the perestroika legislation, this means that in the conduct of foreign trade operations,
commercial considerations and economic principles customarily applicable in interna-
tional markets must at all times guide the foreign trade organizations. Id. at ix; see
also NEw MARKET ORIENTATION, supra note 145, at 2 (noting that since 1979,
China's economic reform policies have pushed the economy towards a greater market
orientation). Because of political developments in China, however, the effect and scope
of economic reforms remain uncertain. Id. at 5.
201. See also NEw MARKET ORIENTATION, supra note 145, at 160 (revealing that
despite China's "clouded" future, eventually new economic reforms in China and other
traditionally NMEs will lead these countries to be classified as economies in transi-
tion). As a result of reforms in these countries, specific economic sectors may become
non-state controlled at varying rates. Id. at 159.
202. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text (proposing a new cate-
gory---"planned economies"--for the antidumping laws).
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sectoral basis.20 3 To use this sectoral method, the DOC would apply the
dumping law for either market economies or NMEs depending on the
capitalistic influences within a particular good's production sector and
regardless of whether the country's economy is generally thought of as
a NME. 04 The sectoral method, however, may be premature because
the effect of trade reforms within traditional NMEs is still uncertain. °0
CONCLUSION
Calculating dumping margins for cases involving NME countries is
especially difficult because of the variables inherent in such a calcula-
tion. It is disappointing that the 1988 Trade Act did little to remedy
the existing problems with the law. The Act only provided a definition
for NMEs and switched the preference for calculating the FMV from
the price method to the factors of production method.
Congress should work to simplify and clarify the NME law so that
companies involved in a dumping investigation can understand and pre-
dict the fate of their exports. With the emergence of Eastern Europe's
new political status, the need for such legislation may prove to be of
paramount importance. In the future, Congress must confront the
NME issue and legislate changes that have real meaning.
203. NEw MARKET ORIENTATION, supra note 145, at 159. A proposed change in
the antidumping law would account for "Bubbles of Capitalism" found in specific pro-
duction industries of the NME. Id. at 158-59. When the DOC finds that an industry or
part of an industry being investigated is controlled by substantial market influences it
could apply a sectoral analysis. Id. at 159. Under sectoral analysis, when the DOC
finds a sector of the NME which is not state controlled, it will base foreign market
value "on prices/costs in that country" and will not use the factors of production
method. Id. As of yet, the DOC has not determined whether this sectoral analysis is
legal. Id. A problem arises when a given sector has inputs governed by capitalistic
influences, such as the price of material inputs, but has other inputs, such as labor,
which are still controlled by the state. Id. at 160.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 173 (proposing that Congress should wait to amend the antidump-
ing laws to account for sectoral analysis while reforms in NME's "are still in their
early stages").
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